if individuals stated they would be unwilling to pay large amounts to play the lottery. An alternative version of the lottery pays $2 n if the first head occurs on flip n, for 35, n ≤ and nothing if there is a run of 35 tails in the first 35 coin flips. The expected value of this lottery is $35; an expected value maximizing agent would not pay more than $35 to play it.
Arguments about the St. Petersburg Paradox are great sport, especially now that a generalized form of the paradox has been shown (by Cox and Sadiraj 2008, and Rieger and Wang 2006) to apply to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) , dual theory of expected utility theory (Yaari 1987) , rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1993) , and expected utility theory as well as expected value theory. But neither side of such arguments provides an answer to the question that is relevant to positive economics: Do real offers to play St. Petersburg lotteries elicit real responses that are inconsistent with expected value theory? Surprisingly, there appears to have been no previous experiment that addresses this question. 
A Real Experiment with Finite St. Petersburg Lotteries
The experiment was designed as follows. Subjects were offered the opportunity to decide whether to pay their own money to play nine finite St. Petersburg lotteries. One of each subject's decisions was randomly selected for real money payoff. Lottery N had a maximum of N coin tosses and paid 2 n euros if the first head occurred on toss number n , for 1, 2,... , n N = and paid nothing if no head occurred. Lotteries were offered for N = 1,2, …,9. Of course, the expected payoff from playing lottery N was N euros. The price offered to a subject for playing lottery N was 25 euro cents lower than N euros. Expected value theory predicts preference for the St. Petersburg lottery N for every one of these lotteries, i.e. for all N = 1,…,9.
The experiment was run in the Maxlab at the University of Magdeburg in February 2007. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were seated at well-separated cubicles and were given printed subject instructions. After reading the instructions, each subject made nine decisions.
Subsequently, the decision sheets were collected. Next, one ball was drawn, for each individual subject, from a bingo cage containing nine balls. The number on the ball drawn for a subject selected the decision that paid money for that subject. If a subject had chosen the lottery in the randomly selected decision, money payoff in the lottery was determined by repeatedly flipping a coin until either the first head appeared or until the specified maximum number of tosses in the selected lottery had been attained. Bingo balls were drawn and the coin was flipped in the presence of the subjects. Each subject was paid the amount determined by this procedure in cash, in Euros, immediately at the end of the experiment. An English version of the subject instructions is included in the appendix.
Do People Make Risk Neutral Choices with Finite St. Petersburg Lotteries?
Thirty subjects participated in the experiment: (a) 26 out of 30 (or 87%) of the individual subjects refused at least one opportunity to play a St. Petersburg lottery for less than its expected value; and (b) over all subjects, 127 out of 270 (or 47%) of their choices were inconsistent with expected value theory. We next ask whether the observed failure of expected value theory is statistically significant. half the subjects made choices that are consistent with expected value (EV) theory. However, as the stakes of the sure amount of money required for playing the St. Petersburg lotteries increase, and the variance of payoffs of the lotteries increase, subjects' risk-averse choices start to dominate. From lotteries for N = 6 to 9, the fraction of choices violating EV theory increases from 57% to 83%.
Next, we apply a linear mixture model (Harless and Camerer 1994) with stochastic preference specification for error rate ε : (a) if option Z is stochastically preferred then Prob(choose Z ) 1 ε = − ; and (b) if option Z is not preferred then Prob(choose Z ) ε = . Let the letter a denote a subject's response that she accepts the offer to play a specific St. Petersburg lottery in the experiment. Let r denote rejection of the offer to play the game. The linear mixture model is used to address the specific question whether, for the nine St. Petersburg lotteries offered to the subjects, the response pattern ( , , , , , , , , )  a a a a a a a a a or the response pattern ( , , , , , , , , ) r r r r r r r r r is more consistent with the data.
With this specification, the log-likelihood is -182 and the estimate of the error rate is 0.29 . The point estimate of the proportion of subjects in the experiment that are not risk neutral (or very slightly risk averse) is 0.48, and the Wald 90% confidence interval of this estimate is (0.30, 0.67). Allowing for a specification with two error rates (one error rate for lotteries 1-4 and another error rate for lotteries 5-9), the estimates of the error rates are 0.50 for the first four lotteries and 0.14 for the last five lotteries.
The point estimate of the proportion of subjects in the experiment that are not risk neutral (or very slightly risk averse) is 0.77, with Wald 90% confidence interval of (0.63, 0.91) . The log-likelihood is -164. Using data only for lotteries 4 -9, that require payments in excess of 3 euros to accept, the error rate is 0.18 and the point estimate of the proportion of subjects in the experiment that are not risk neutral (or very slightly risk averse) is 0.71 with 90% confidence interval (0.56, 0.87). The loglikelihood is -103. Table I summarizes these results. Figures in parentheses show Wald 90% confidence intervals.
Concluding Remarks
The St. Petersburg Paradox has been known for almost 300 years. Arguments about its relevance to judging the plausibility of expected value theory are almost as old. Although arguments about the paradox are great sport, they don't address the original question that motivated its introduction: Are decision makers risk neutral ? We report what appears to be the first experiment with real money payoffs for finite St. Petersburg lotteries. Data from our experiment support the conclusion that a majority of subjects in the experiment are risk averse, not risk neutral.
Appendix: Subject Instructions
Please write your identification code here:
A coin is tossed no more than 9 times. Your payoff depends on the number of tosses until Head appears for the first time. If Head appears for the first time on flip number N then you are paid 2 N Euros. Table A .I shows the possible outcomes: 
Payoffs
After you make your decisions, one of the rows will be selected by chance and your Yes or No decision in that row will become binding. The selection of the row is carried out by drawing a ball from a bingo cage containing balls with numbers 1,2, …, 9. The number on the drawn ball determines the row of the table that is selected.
If, for example, row 6 is selected for payoff then: (a) if your decision in row 6 is "No" then no money changes hands; (b) if your decision in row 6 is "Yes" then you will pay the experimenter 5.75 Euros to play the coin toss lottery with a maximum of 6 tosses and possible outcomes in the first 6 rows of 
